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"AT WILL" FRANCHISE TERMINATIONS AND THE ABUSE OF
RIGHTS DOCTRINE: THE MATURATION OF LOUISIANA LAW
Primitive systems of law are often characterized by their
formality and rigidity. If the right form is used, a contract may
be enforced despite unfair terms or even vices of consent. This
kind of contractual security is at the cost of permitting injustice....
The movement in Roman law from rigid contracts to consensual
contracts and the development of a doctrine of good faith and
judicial inquiry into both the fact of agreement and the fairness
of terms is properly considered a sign of the maturation of
Roman law.*
Hypothetical: A franchisor grants to a franchisee an exclusive
dealership for the distribution and sale of certain household appliances in a specified area of a state. Termination may be by either
party at any time, for any reason, ten days after written notice
thereof to the non-terminating party. Eight years later sales of the
appliances in the area covered by the franchise have increased over
1000 percent, an average annual increase of 143 percent, and the
franchisor's products comprise almost 26 percent of the franchisee's
sales, up from 6 percent at the beginning of the contractual relationship. One day the franchisor gives the required notice of termination. and transfers the franchise to a rival dealer of the now exfranchisee, because animosity developed between the franchisor's
president and the president of the parent corporation of the franchisee. The franchisee loses its good will in the area with respect to
the product line, and is forced to lay off some of its employees.
Although this situation might seem unlikely, particularly in view of
the "rational man" assumption at the foundation of modern economic
theory, such "hypotheticals" fill the case reporters.'
This article proposes a legal analysis for determining the effect
of at will termination clauses in franchise contracts.' After a brief
Sachse, Unconscionable Contracts, in ESSAYS ON THE CrvIL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
274 (V.Dainow ed. 1969).
1. See, e.g., Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.. 594 F.2d 129 (6th Cir.).
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979). discussed in the text at p. 220. infra.
2. A typical at will termination claise allows termination on specified notice, by
either party "at any time, for any reason." Most franchise contracts provide for termination should the franchisee violate any or all of specified obligations in the contract,
with forebearance by the franchisor not constituting waiver of the franchisor's right to
terminate for subsequent breaches. Because many of the clauses "linked" to the termination clause provide for the alteration of the standards or duties imposed therein by
the franchisor (who may thereby impose impracticable demands upon the franchisee)
such clauses will be treated as if they give the franchisor the ability to terminate the
contract "at will."
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survey of the federal treatment of the issue of franchise terminations,' and a more extensive survey of the Louisiana experience, the
article concludes that the civilian doctrine of abuse of rights provides a necessary framework within which to resolve individual
cases.
The volume of business done by firms pursuant to franchise
agreements' has increased rapidly during the past decade; this increase is due primarily to the attractiveness of the franchise form of
industrial organization to relatively small investors. Usually, only a
small amount of start-up capital is needed; the franchisor typically
finances or arranges financing for the franchisee. Marketing techniques developed by expert managers are utilized, as are sophisticated uniform accounting procedures. Dealers are taught entrepreneurial skills at special training centers, and receive regular
3. Analogous problems arise in several areas of contract law. Although the
Louisiana treatment of them will be scrutinized separately, some mention should be
made here of their general treatment. For instance, employment contracts often allow
for termination of the employment relationship for unsatisfactory performance. In
grappling with the problem of regulating such contracts, the courts have imposed requirements of reasonability, good faith, or subjective taste according to the nature of
the employment; thus menial or clerical positions have been held to the reasonable or
good faith standard, whereas firings of executive personnel have been based upon
more subjective standards. Cf. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Rich, 254 Mich. 82, 235 N.W. 846
(1931) (In dictum, the court stated that a "provision in a contract for termination at the
option of a party is valid. But where the relationship is commercial and does not involve fancy, taste, sensibility, judgment, or other personal features, the option may be
exercised only in good faith." 254 Mich. at 84-85, 235 N.W. at 846). See generally
Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Note, Employment at
Will-Limitations on Employers' Freedom to Terminate, 85 LA. L. REV. 710 (1975)
(discussing Monge t Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974), in which an
employee fired in bad faith or with malice recovered damages based upon a breach of
the employment contract. The court noted that such dismissals "were not in the best
interest of the economic system or the public good." 35 LA. L. REV. at 712 (footnote
omitted)). See also Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 690 (1979); Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 271 (1975); Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 244 (1975); Annot., 6 A.L.R. 1497 (1920).
Contracts to sell immovables are often contingent upon (1) the buyer's satisfaction
with the vendor's title; Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1424 (1967); Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 455 (1956);
Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1114 (1955); Annot., 8 Am. Jur. P.O.F.2d 717-44 (1976); (2) the
buyer's obtaining suitable financing for the purchase; Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 880 (1977);
or (8) approval by a third party; Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 555 (1966); Annot., 167 A.L.R. 411
(1947). Movables are sold sometimes on a "sale or return" basis; Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d
842 (1964); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 200 (1962). The standards of behavior imposed reflect
the courts' attempts to balance the forces of equity, freedom of contract, and certainty
of contractual relations.
4. The terms franchise, dealership, and distributorship contracts or agreements
are used synonymously herein.
5. Franchisor and manufacturer are used synonymously herein.
6. Franchisee, dealer, and distributor are used synonymously herein.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

evaluations of their performance from franchisors in the form of
written reports and personal contact with area representatatives
and district managers. Because of managerial, advertising, and production economies, an increase in sales may result in increased profits for the dealer, and increased royalty revenues for the franchisor.'
Franchising is attractive also from the manufacturer's viewpoint. Through franchising the manufacturer may avoid high capital
outlay costs, as well as large inventories for high turnover products.
The manufacturer also acquires an assured distribution network
without many of the tax complexities inherent in vertical integration. National advertising campaigns, made possible through
cooperative advertising schemes, may increase the national demand
for the product. Finally, the franchisor benefits directly from the
franchisee's strong profit motives and enhanced entrepreneurial
abilities.'
Though desirable in many aspects, the franchise relationship is
not without its drawbacks.9 Abuses abound and have been the object
of congressional investigation."0 The primary source of abuse lies in
7. See Brown & Cohen, Franchising: Constitutional Considerations for "Good
Cause" State Legislation, 16 Hous. L. REV. 21, 28-29 (1978),[hereinafter cited as Brown
& Cohen). See also Comment, Fairness in Franchising: The Need for a Good Cause
Termination Requirement in California, 13 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 780 (1980).
8. See Brown & Cohen, supra note 7, at 29-33. Cf. Noble u McClatchy
Newspapers, 533 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, judgment vacated and
remanded, 433 U.S. 904.(1977). wherein the court noted that manufacturers "have a
significant incentive to distribute their products through independent contractors
rather than through employees, agents or consignees. Use of independent distributors
avoids the substantial investment, expense and risk incident to alternate methods of
distribution." 533 F.2d at 1088-89.
9. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: REALITIES AND REMEDIES (2d ed. 1978); H. BROWN,
FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING (1969); PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, REPRESENTING
THE FRANCHISOR AND FRANCHISEE (1979); C. ROSENFIELD, THE LAW OP FRANCHISING

41970); see Brown & Cohen, supra note 7; Gelhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-FranchiseCancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465; Hewitt, Good Faith or Unconscionability-FranchieRemedies for Termination, 29 Bus. LAW. 227 (1973); Hewitt,
Termination of Dealer Franchises and the Code-Mizing Classified and Coordinated
Uncertaintywith Conflict, 22 Bus. LAW. 1075 (1967); Rudnick & Young, FranchiseSymposium; Recent Developments in the Law Affecting Franchise Organizations-A
Primeron the Regulation of FranchiseSales, 1980 ARIz. ST. L.J. 453; Comment, supra
note 7; Note, Constitutional Obstacles to State "Good Cause" Restrictions on Franchise Terminations, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1487 (1974).
10. Cf. Proposed Franchising Termination Reform Actk Hearings on H.R. 5016
and H.R. 914 Before the Subcomm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong.,
1st Session 6080 (1977).
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the gross inequality in bargaining power which usually exists between the franchisee and the more powerful franchisor."t As the
number of dealers of a given product increases, the relative importance of any one of them to the franchisor decreases. To the extent
that sufficient numbers of alternative investors are available, few
constraints exist on the franchisor's behavior, with respect to any
one franchisee, other than the franchise agreement itself.
That constraint usually is illusory. The contract is one typically
referred to as an "adhesion" contract." The agreement consists of a
long, multiple-page form document offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, replete with numerous disciplinary devices in favor of the
franchisor.1 Dealers must follow the standards set down in operation manuals, which may be revised by the franchisor at its discretion. Sales volume criteria often require the dealer to have sales
equal to or exceeding the average over a specified area and time.
Unless all sales per dealer are equal, almost one-half of the dealers
as a matter of probability and mathematics will have sales below the
average. Thus, many franchisees are in constant peril of technical
breaches of the contract. Dealers must file voluminous, expensive,
and frequent reports, and attend conferences at which their
vulnerability to the franchisor is both emphasized and apparent.
11. See Brown & Cohen, supra note 7, at 26; Comment, supra note 7, at 781.
12. See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); R. UNCER. LAW IN
MODERN SocIETY (1976); Brown & Cohen, supra note 7, at 27; Dawson, Economic
Duress and the FairExchange in French and German Law (PartI1), 12 TuL. L. REV.
42 (1937); Dawson. Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German
Law (Part D, 11 TUL. L. REV. 345 (1937); Duncan, Adhesion Contracts: A Twentieth
Century Problem for a Nineteenth Century Code, 34 LA. L. REV. 1081 (1974); Gelhorn,
supra note 9, at 486 n.81; Hale. Bargaining,Duress, and Economic Liberty, 48 COLUM.
L. REV. 608 (1943); Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's Death of Contract?-Inductions From a Study of Commerical Good Faith in First-PartyInsurance Contracts, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 30, 836 (1980); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contracts, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943): Lenhoff, Contracts of
Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract. A Comparative Study in the Light of
American and Foreign Law, 36 TUL. L. REV. 481 (1962); Lenhoff, The Scope of Compulsory Contracts Proper, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 586 (1948); Litvinoff, Offer and Acceptance in LouisianaLaw: A Comparative Analysis: Part l-Acceptance. 28 LA. L. REV.
163. 205-10 (1968); Radin, Contract Obligation and the Human Will, 48 COLUM. L. REV.
675 (1943); Wigmore, The Scope of the Contract- Concept, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 569
(1948); Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts, 14 hNri & CoMP. L.Q.
172 (1965); Comment, Nullity of Contracts for Limited Mental Capacity and Business
Experience of a Party: The Molaison Case, 23 TUL. L. REV. 250, 265 (1948); Note,
Obligations-Doctrineof economic Duress, 82 TUL. L. REV. 512 (1958). Patterson introduced the term "contract of adhesion" to the common law. Patterson, The Delivery
of a L(fe Insurance Policy, 88 HARY. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919).
13. See Brown & Cohen, supra note 7, at 24, 34; Comment, supra note 7, at 785.
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Furthermore, the franchisor has an array of reward and punishment
techniques with which to control franchisees, including preferred
treatment to obedient dealers, awards and fee penalities, and most
significantly, termination or non-renewal of the franchise, or threats
thereof. Termination and non-renewal threats are effective because
dealers fear the loss of their capital investment and the good will
which they have created ."' One commentator states that the "contractual right of franchisors to terminate without cause and without
payment to franchisees for the good will value of the franchised
business is the single most serious problem in the franchising relationship.""5
Although the judicial response to claims arising from such
agreements has been far from uniform, the majority of the courts
seem to enforce franchise contracts strictly according to the terms
therein. Adhering to the classical doctrine of freedom of contracts
and the will theory of contract formation, the decisions indicate that
courts do not have the duty of relieving a contractual party from a
consensual bad bargain." When the contracting parties are of approximately equal economic status-with skilled, experienced
representatives bargaining for concessions-the classical contract
model probably provides appropriate solutions in a sufficient
number of cases so as to make the approach a "proper" one. Because
equal bargaining power seldom exists, however, between the parties
to franchise contracts, application of traditional contractual analysis
usually leads to harsh results.
As a result of persistent reports of abuses of the franchise relationships, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) studied the problem,
then implemented a set of disclosure requirements applicable to the
sale or transfer of franchise rights.' The FTC Rule and its com14. See Comment, supra note 7, at 784.
15. Id. at 784 n.17 (citation omitted).
16. See, e.g., Nelson Radio & Supply Co., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th
Cir. 1952); Howard v. Mercury Record Corp., 178 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1949): Wilson v.
Cost Plus of Vivian, Inc., 375 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979). The cases collected
under L.S.A-C.C. art. 1901 (West) are legion. See also Comment, Unconscionable
Contract Provisions:A History of Unenforceabilityfrom Roman Law to the UCC, 42
TUL. L. REV. 193, 208 (1967).
17. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 436 et seq. (1979) [hereinafter cited as the FTC Rule]. See
also the final interpretive guidelines to the FTC Rule, at 44 Fed. Reg. 49966 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as the FTC Guidelines]. The FTC Rule and Guidelines have been
subjected to considerable comment and controversy. See, e.g., Black, 35 Bus. LAw. 409
(1980); Comment, The Federal Trade Commission FranchiseDisclosure Rule, 13 JOHN
MARSHALL L. REV. 637 (1980); Comment, supra note 7, at 789-93; Comment, Federal
Franchise Regulation. A Definitional Dilemma, 13 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 813 (1980).
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plementary Guidelines require disclosure of material matters contained within the franchise transaction. The Rule is aimed primarily
at preventing abuses or surprises in the contractual formation stage,
rather than in the termination stage. Moreover, the Rule does not
purport to govern the substantive relationships between the contracting parties, but instead mandates disclosure of certain aspects
of the relationships. The implementation of the Rule and Guidelines
indicates increasing governmental concern about the franchise form
of industrial organization.
That this concern is not entirely of recent vintage is obvious
from an examination of the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act. 8
Franchise abuses have been particularly prevalent in the automobile
industry, and strong politicial pressure from dealers resulted in
passage of Act. One section of the Act is particularly relevant to
the present inquiry." That section proscribes franchise terminations
by an automobile manufacturer acting without good faith. A franchisor acts without good faith when he fails to weigh the equities involved in reaching his decision to terminate the franchise. Because a
termination without good faith is proscribed only if it is accompanied by coercive behavior by the manufacturer, dealer recovery
under the Act is difficult."
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221 et seq. (1976).
19. 15 U.S.C § 1222 (1976).
20. An early Second Circuit decision hastened passage of the Act. BushwickDecatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940). Bushwick involved
an at will termination clause in a car manufacturer's dealership contract. The court
upheld the right of Ford to terminate the contract at any time regardless of the
presence or lack of good faith. In a not-too subtle call for legislative action, the court
refused to "rewrite" the contract:
With a power of termination at will here so unmistakenly expressed, we certainly
cannot assert that a limitation of good faith was anything the parties had in mind.
Such a limitation can be read into the agreement only as an overriding requirement of public policy. This seems an extreme step for judges to take .... But.
generally speaking, the situation arises from the strong bargaining position which
economic factors give the great automobile manufacturing companies: the dealers
are not mislead or imposed upon, but accept as nonetheless advantageous an
agreement in form bilateral, in fact one-sided. To attempt to redress this balance
by judicial action without legislative authority appears to us a doubtful policy.
Id at 677.
Because of the stringent two-prong requirement of a showing of bad faith and
coercion (which is vaguely defined in the Act at 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e), and excludes persuasion, pleadings, cajoling, etc.) a burdensome evidentiary task is placed upon
claimants under the Act. The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has had
numerous cases under the Act; most claimants failed to recover. See Southern
Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 375 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1967); Victory
Motors of Savannah, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 357 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1966);
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The United States Supreme Court has not been a leader in the
development of this aspect of substantive commercial law, and has
encountered the issue of franchise terminations only indirectly. The
Court has faced the problem of franchise terminations most often in
the antitrust field." In Emich Motors v. General Motors Corp.," a
civil case involving the admissibility of a prior criminal conviction in
an antitrust suit, the Court set out the standards by which to determine what violations the jury had found in reaching a general verdict
to a multiple count indictment. One count alleged that the defendant,
General Motors Corporation, had unlawfully used the termination and
threats of termination of short-term franchise contracts to secure
dealer favoritism towards the defendant's subsidiary, General Motors
Acceptance Corporation. Although the issue was not squarely before
it, the Court hinted that such actions might create a private antitrust cause of action.u
A similar oblique opportunity for the Court to deal with franchise terminations arose in Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Corp.""In
Abbott-Stansell Motors Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 333 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1964);
Woodard v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1962).
In a recent case, however, recovery was granted. H.C. Blackwell Co., Inc. v. Kenworth Truck Co., 620 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1980). Although the court adhered to the twopronged test in Blackwell, 620 F.2d at 106, it found no error in the jury's award to the
plaintiff dealer of $90,000 damages based upon Chrysler's failure to renew the franchise despite the dealer's expenditures of the amount recovered as damages in a
diligent effort to comply with Chrysler's renewal demands. The dealer was given only
ninety days in which to comply with the demands, even though the manufacturer's
representative testified that it would have taken the dealer at least one year to meet
those demands. See generally Note, The Elusive Measure of Damages for Wrongful
Termination of Automobile Dealership Franchises,74 YALE L.J. 354 (1964): Annot., 50
A.L.R. Fed. 245 (1980); Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 324 (1973). Louisiana has a statute similar
to the federal government's. LA. R.S. 32:1251-1256.1 (1950 & Supp. 1976 & 1980). See
Benton-Volvo-Metairie, Inc. v. Volvo S.W., Inc., 479 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1973); Best
Motor & Implement Co., Inc. v. International Harvester Co., 252 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1958);
See also Davis v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1969) (decided under
Michigan law). Comparable statutes govern gasoline franchises. See, e.g., Arnott v.
American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), disscussed in Note, Antitrust and Franchise Considerations at the Gasoline Service Station, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1160
(1980). See also Jordon, Unconscionability at the Gas Station, 62 MINN. L. REv. 813
(1978).
21. But see National Muffler Dealers' Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979)
(held: a trade organization for muffler dealers with membership limited to franchisees
of Midas Int'l Corp. (Midas) and formed for the purpose of negotiating unitedly with
the management of Midas (almost 80 percent of all Midas dealers were Ass'n members)
was not a business league for the purpose of a federal income tax exemption).
22. 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
23. Id. at 570 n.7.
24. 347 U.S. 89 (1954). This case was companion litigation to United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc, 334 U.S. 131 (1948). reversing 70 F. Supp. 53 (1946). Para-
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an alternative argument favoring its right to cancel certain leases,
the lessor, Paramount, contended that its lease provided for termination "for any reason." The Supreme Court found that the trial
court concluded properly that this clause meant for any legal or
substantial reason, not for any capricious or arbitrary reason." Anti.
trust implications arising from the franchise relationship may be
more subtle than the coercive use of the termination power." For instance, in assessing the antitrust impact of the Brown Shoe-Kinney
Shoe merger,' the trial court found, as did the Supreme Court, that
the relevant geographic market was every city and its environs with
a population exceeding 10,000 in which Brown and Kinney sold shoes
at retail through stores they either owned or controlled. Stores participating in the Brown Franchise or Wohl Plan were considered to
be "controlled" by Brown because of the extensive interrelationship
between the franchisor Brown and the franchisee retailers."
Finally, in a case involving the termination of aid to welfare recipients,' the Court recognized the importance of "wealth in this
country [which] takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of property," and also noted that
"'[sjociety today is built around entitlement. The automobile dealer
has his franchise . . . [which is an] aid [to] security and
independence.''" Whether the Court merely was being philosophical
or was signalling a policy shift regarding the juridical nature of property interests remains uncertain.
mount was attempting to evict Partmar from a theatre leased in conjunction with a
franchise, on the grounds that because the franchise was declared illegal by the trial
court, the lease also fell. For Paramount to prevail it was in the "anomolous position of
attempting to prove that its agreements with Partmar violated the antitrust laws."
347 U.S. at 95. The Court held that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the issue.
26. 347 U.S. at 96 (quoting Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp. v. Partmar Corp.,
97 F. Supp. 552 (S.D. Cal. 1951)).
26. Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (use of GMC's
power to ensure compliance with a Chevrolet dealer conspiracy not to deal with "discounters," "bootleggers," or "bird dogs").
27. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). The antitrust laws,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1976), prohibit certain combinations between persons when the
effect is or may be substantially to restrain interstate commerce. Corporations are
"persons" under the statute; however, ascertaining the legal entity appropriate for
analyzing problems arising under the antitrust laws may be difficult in cases involving
complex organizational structures. Essentially, the Court had to determine "what"
Brown Shoe Company "was," to determine the legality of "its" merger with the Kinney
Shoe Company.
28. 870 U.S. at 337 n.66.
29. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
30. I& at 262 n.8 (quoting Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)). See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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The federal circuit courts"' have dealt more frequently with franchise terminations and other effects arising from the franchise relationship. The Fifth Circuit has yet to adopt a clear or uniform
analytical approach to problems involving franchise terminations
and in fact has avoided the issue whenever possible. An early 1950's
case" involved the franchisee's action for damages arising from the
tortious termination of an appliance franchise contract. The court
upheld the franchisor's exception of no cause of action by stating
that the termination was in conformance with an "at will" termination clause in the contract. Twenty years later, when the tortious
breach of contract doctrine was developed more fully, the Fifth Circuit
found that under applicable Florida law, the defendant master franchisor had interfered with the plaintiff franchisee's contract with a
previously authorized subfranchisee, thereby tortiously breaching
the master franchise agreement."
The posture in which the franchise relationship has appeared
before the court is as interesting as it is varied. Budweiser escaped
a claim for violation of an alleged oral franchise contract when the
court applied the parol evidence rule to prevent the alleged franchisee from introducing evidence to prove the true nature of the
parties' relationship." Invoking the rule permitted the court to avoid
the issue presented by the plaintiff, who asserted that the defendant
brewer's threat not to sell the plaintiff beer for failure to set up a
sales record card system was a breach of the franchise agreement.'
Minimum contacts satisfying due process criteria for obtaining personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants may be the result of
the franchise relationship," but a referee in bankruptcy has no more
31. The federal appellate court treatment will emphasize the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals decisions.
32. Nelson Radio & Supply Co., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1952).
See also Howard v. Mercury Record Corp., 178 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1949).
3. House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64 (6th
Cir. 1972). See generally Frost, The Tort of Bad Faith, 9 CoLO. LAW. 1173 (1980); Symposium, Sixth Annual Survey of Developments in Alabama Law; 1978-79; Torts- Tort
of Bad Faith, 31 ALA. L. REV. 858 (1980); Note, FirstParty InsurerBad Faith Arrives
in Arizona. 22 Apiz. L. REV. 274 (1980). See also LA. R.S. 22:657 & 658 (1950).
34. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 353 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1965).
85. Although the nature of the parties' relationship probably was in fact that of
franchisor-franchisee, an "established" rule of law was invoked without an express
analysis of its purposes or its suitability for the instant case.
36. See Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.
1966) (a franchisor of pure breed male Leghorn chickens, known as "Nick Chicks," was
subject to personal jurisdiction of the Texas courts by operation of the state's long-arm
statute, because of the franchisor's extensive and systematic contacts with Texas arising out of the franchise contractual relationship with its Texas franchisees).
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power than does the bankrupt to prevent the termination of a franchise by a franchisor due to the nonpayment of royalties."1
Adherence to classical contract theory and a hostility towards an
analysis based in part upon the relative economic status of the parties
is evidenced in Sonnleitner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue."
A taxpayer sought to avoid the assessment of ordinary income taxes
on money received in the sale of an exclusive franchise and attributable to a convenant not to compete. The defendant claimed
that economic duress vitiated his consent to the franchise contract,
but the court, laying down a heavy burden, rejected his claim. Three
essential elements were required to make out a prima facie case of
economic duress: "(1) wrongful acts or threats; (2) financial distress
caused by the wrongful acts or threats; and (3) the absence of any
reasonable alternative to the terms presented by the wrongdoer.""
The Fifth Circuit recently sidestepped the problem by focusing
upon the plaintiffs lack of damages arising from an alleged breach
of a franchise contract.'" Plaintiff Bel-Mar alleged injury due to the
breach by the defendant, Woods & Copeland (W&C), of an alleged
exclusive dealership to sell Cleveland Tractors in certain areas of
Mississippi. Acting in the absence of a contractual termination date,
W&C entered into a new franchise agreement with one Taylor on
June 15, 1976, and terminated its relationship with Bel-Mar on
September 1, 1976. The court held that since Bel-Mar made no sales
during the period between the agreement with Taylor and the termination of the franchise, no damage resulted from the alleged breach.
The plaintiff also failed to recover specially incurred demonstration
expenditures of $24,000 because, in the absence of a franchise clause
covering the situation, the plaintiff supposedly took "the risk that
W&C might terminate the franchise."' 1
On still another occasion, the court avoided grappling directly
with the problem. In Avis Rent-A-Car,'" the issue was whether the
defendant Avis had acted rightfully in terminating summarily the
license of plaintiff Gulf Shores, Avis' franchisee." Avis granted franchise rights to SALCO respecting the Avis rental car business in
37. See Schokbeton Ind., Inc. v. Schokbeton Prod. Corp. (In re Schokbeton Ind.,
Inc.). 446 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1972); Acrete v. Schokbeton Prod. Corp. (In re Schokbeton
Ind., Inc.), 449 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1971).
38. 698 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1979).
89. Id. at 468.
40. Bel-Mar Ford Tractor v. Wood & Copeland Mfg.. Inc.. 602 F.2d 1199 (1979).
41. Id. at 1200.
42. Gulf Shores Leasing Corp. v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 441 F.2d 1385 (5th
Cir. 1971).
43. Id. at 1387.
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three Louisiana cities: Lake Charles, Lafayette and Baton Rouge.
These rights were assigned to Gulf Shores in a three-party agreement." Construing the assignments and franchises under Louisiana
law, the court held that the applicable termination clause dated from
the execution of the assignment; thus Avis benefited from the agreement's termination without cause provision. Gulf Shore's claim that
such a clause was unconscionable, raised for the first time on appeal,
was argued too late."
The somewhat startling case of Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana
Refrigeration, Inc." reveals the extent to which the Fifth Circuit is
reluctant to question classical contract theory. Corenswet, an independent wholesale distributor based in New Orleans, had held exclusive distributorship rights in southern Louisiana for certain
Amana products since 1969. Amana attempted to terminate Corenswet's franchise in 1976 through an "at will" termination clause."
Corenswet sought injunctive relief from the attempted termination
and claimed Amana's action was arbitrary and capricious. The
district court'" agreed, finding that Amana was attempting to breach
the franchise agreement and, furthermore, was violating the
Uniform Commercial Code's general principle requiring good faith
dealings." The appellate court found the district court's opinion not
clearly erroneous, and Amana appealed the preliminary injunction
prohibiting termination of the franchise. Pending that appeal,
Amana drafted a new one-year distributorship agreement. When
Corenswet refused to execute the new contract, Amana sued in the
44. Id.
45. Id at 1391-92.
46. 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979).
47. 594 F.2d at 131.
48. Honorable Alvin B. Rubin, for the United States Eastern District Court of
Louisiana, presiding.
49. The U.C.C. defines an agreement as "the bargain of the parties in fact as
found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in this Act ....
Whether an agreement has legal consequences is determined by the provisions of this
Act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts .. " U.C.C. § 1-201(3). A contract
means "the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement as affected
by this Act and any other applicable rules of law." U.C.C. § 1-201(11). Good faith means
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned," U.C.C. § 1-201(19), and in the
case of sales by a merchant, includes "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade," U.C.C. § 2-103(1). The phrase "good faith" appears
over fifty times in the U.C.C. See generally Eisenberg, Good Faith Under the Uniform

Commercial Code-A New Look at an Old Problem, 1971 CoM. L.J. 296; Farnsworth,
Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reaaonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 666 (1968).

1981]

COMMENTS

same district court, claiming that the refusal to sign the agreement
was a just cause to terminate the franchise relationship. Although
the district court agreed with Amana in the second suit, it ruled
that if Corenswet did enter into the contract, Amana could not
refuse to renew the agreement at the end of any one-year term
"without good reason," a ruling which Amana appealed.
The issue before the Fifth Circuit then became whether a franchisor, under a distributorship agreement of indefinite duration and
terminable by either party at any time for any reason, may arbitrarily terminate the agreement under both the terms of the contract and under the U.C.C. (as adopted by Iowa)." A brief history of
the parties' past dealings with one another is instructive. Corenswet, in developing an important new market for Amana products,
had invested over $1.6 million in south Louisiana for that purpose;
as a result of Corenswet's efforts, annual Amana sales in the area increased from a mere $200,000 in 1969 to $2.5 million in 1976. Sales
attributable to Amana products constituted 26 percent of Corenswet's sales in 1976, up from 6 percent in 1969; obviously, the parties had significant financial interdependence. But personal animosity between the president of Amana and the president of
Corenswet's parent corporation, Select Brands, Inc., caused friction.
Desiring to transfer the franchise to George H. Lehleitner & Co.
(another distributor in New Orleans), Amana first attempted to provoke Corenswet into terminating the agreement by repeatedly increasing its demand for inventory security, but Corenswet met each
demand. Amana, abandoning its attempt to coerce Corenswet into
withdrawing from the contract, then declared its intent to terminate
the franchise, thus precipitating the instant litigation."
The Fifth Circuit construed the contract to allow termination for
any cause deemed sufficient by the party electing to terminate the
agreement, thus not prohibiting bad faith termination. Following a
dubious analysis of the effect of Iowa's adoption of the U.C.C." and
of decisions cited favorably by each litigant," the court stated its
50. 594 F.2d at 131.
51. Id.at 132.
52. "Although most distributorship agreements, like franchise agreements, are
more than sales contracts, the courts have not hesitated to apply the Uniform Commercial Code to cases involving such agreements." Id. at 184.
53. The court distinguished an early Tennessee case cited by the plaintiffs,
Duboia v.Gentry, 182 Tenn. 103, 184 S.W.2d 369 (1945) (construing "for any reason" in
a lease termination clause to mean "any good reason or just reason," 182 Tenn. at 108,
184 S.W.2d at 371), by asserting that the Tennessee court was ruling on a question of
law, whereas the instant case involved a question of fact, under Iowa law, beause the

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42

uncertainty as to the proper resolution of the issue and, after noting
the varied approaches of decisions and scholars, concluded that
while public policy may not frown on the enforcement of any and all
contract clauses permitting termination without cause, public policy
"does abhor economic overreaching-the use of superior bargaining
power to secure grossly unfair advantage."" Thus, the court indicated that the proper analysis lay in the doctrine of unconscionability, and not that of good faith, for "[iln an area such as this,
where considerations of stare decisis are of importance, we should
hesitate to depart from established case authority absent fair
assurance that the state's courts would interpret the Uniform Commercial Code to forbid 'bad faith' or 'arbitrary' terminations of
distributorship contracts."" The district court judgment in favor of
Corenswet was reversed."
Judge Rubin again dealt with the doctrine of good faith performance of obligations in Makofsky v. Cunningham."' A purchaser of
immovable property entered into a contract to sell conditioned upon
the ability of the seller to deliver a marketable title. To frustrate
the seller's fulfillment of this condition, the buyer induced one Goff,
the holder of an earlier recorded purchase option, to execute and
record an affidavit that a recorded purported cancellation by Goff of
the previous option was fraudulent, thus clouding the seller's title.
The court held that the buyer's actions breached his implied obligation under Louisiana law to perform the contract in good faith. '
district court looked to extrinsic evidence in interpreting the contract. 594 F.2d at 134.
135 n.4. Instead, the court embraced dictum in the Iowa decision of Harper v. Cedar
Rapids Television Co., Inc., 244 N.W.2d 782 (Iowa 1976) ("The contract being terminable at will plaintiff could have been discharged for virtually any reason," 244
N.W.2d at 791). 594 F.2d at 135 n.4. Harper, however, involved the termination of the
employment contract of a TV news anchor-man who had engaged in repeated acts of
misconduct with his co-employees, and who had been discharged for good cause. Additionally. the nature of the relationship lent itself more readily to a purely subjective
standard, rather than requiring reasonable grounds, for termination. See note 3, supra.
54. 594 F.2d at 139.
55. Id. at 138.
56. Although the court approvingly cited Gelhorn. supra note 9. it failed to note
the following statement by him: "The manufacturer's right to terminate should not be
subject to the possibility that some personal animosity may exist between a dealer
and the manufacturer's agents. Rather the relevant facts are whether the termination
was commercially justifiable land permitted by the contract] and whether the relative
burdens resulting from it (the termination) are so disproportionate as to be unfair."
Gelhorn, supra note 9, at 521 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
57. 576 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1978).
58. Id. at 1234. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1901. The court also resorted to Civil Code
article 2040, because the conditional obligor had prevented the fulfillment of the condition. See the discussion of this article at p. 228, infra.

1981]

COMMENTS

A synthesis of the federal approach to problems arising from the
formation, existence, and termination of the franchise relationship is
not possible presently, for no unified doctrine is apparent under the
statutes or jurisprudence. To the extent that Louisiana legislation
and jurisprudence tend to follow federal counterparts, however,
such comparative analysis lends some aid in developing a cogent
legal theory. Although the nucleus of the appropriate doctrine is
present in Louisiana, albeit in the formative stage, an exposition of
some fundamental aspects of civilian contract theory is necessary to
place in proper perspective the theory of abuse of rights as it
relates to the franchise relationship. The perspective will be
developed by references to codal, doctrinal, and judicial authorities.
Because of the variety of situations and endeavors which typify
human activities, no legislature could possibly regulate a priori all
aspects of interpersonal relationships. General rules of public order
may be and have been prescribed, however, as a means of guiding
the courts in the resolution of particular cases or controversies.
These rules reflect a tension between several social policies which
sometimes conflict with one another. Security of transactions,
freedom of contract, supremacy of the will, and fundamental fairness
are names sometimes given to the policies." In large part, the industrial revolution was made possible by the development of contract law and the contemporaneous attempt to attach certain, or at
least predictable, consequences to the combination of words, actions,
and thoughts called a contract. As the uncertainty of the consequences of an action increases, so does the risk of undesirable
results; economic theory reveals that risk-taking entails costs, which
must ultimately be borne by consumers. Therefore, the policy of
stability of transactions is well-suited to a free enterprise system
with the goal of minimum-cost production of a variety of goods.,'
Together with the policy of security of transactions, the goals of
freedom of contract and supremacy of the will also serve important
roles in a capitalistic economic system. Individuals acting to achieve
"selfish" profit maximization might be characterized as the invisible
hand regulating the economy; the ability to contract in a manner to
effectuate that will is an important channel for the guiding of funds
into optimum uses. Traditional analysis predicates the utility of
these paradigms upon the notion that economic actors function in
atomistic markets lacking significant concentrations of economic
59. See Gelhorn, supra note 9, at 475.
60. For an excellent, and more eloquent, discussion of these concepts, see generally Kessler, supra note 12, at 629-33.
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power. The validity of this assumption has come under forceful attack
in recent years. 1 Various legal tools have been developed in order to
compensate for the imbalanced economic forces often encountered in
a particular class of transactions. Restorative forces not only serve
the practical goal of easing economic ills, but also reflect the value
western society traditionally places upon fundamental fairness in
dealings, both personal and commercial. An understanding of these
principles and of their clash is crucial to a coherent analysis of problems arising from the franchise relationship.
Assuming that any one policy or value set will receive a nonconclusive, positive weight in a judicial system, every system must
determine the proper "mix," or emphasis, of the value sets."2 The
common law has proceeded to establish the mix on a case basis; the
civil law, Louisiana in particular, has embedded that mix in a comprehensive legislative scheme. An examination of the Louisiana Civil
Code discloses that a pervasive notion of good faith and subjective
right-dealing intertwines with and complements the classical theory
of contract.
Agreements not contra bonos mores or not contrary to public
order, legally entered into," bind the parties thereto and create
obligations,6' some of which are enforceable in the courts." Obliga61. See the authorities cited in note 12, supra. It has been noted, for instance,
that in addition to the disintegration of traditional contractual damage rules, a "change
in societal values and expectations has also undercut most of ... [the] formal external
rules governing contract formation, construction, and breach." Holmes, supra note 12,
at 331. Instead of one body of contract law, analysis has shifted to three distinct
aspects within the field: the formational process, the status and relationships of the
contracting parties, and the nature of the underlying transaction. These aspects are
approached by asking how the contract was formed, who the parties are, and what
kind of contract it is. Id. at 343-44. But cf. Note, Obligations-Doctrineof Economic
Duress, 32 TUL. L. REV. 512, 516 11958). The writer submits that a fourth inquiry is
necessary: In light of the several interests of society and of the parties, how should the
contract be performed and enforced? This query is in keeping with civilian tradition,
which "conceives contractual obligations as a duty to maintain a certain conduct, while
the common law conceives a contractual obligation as a guarantee of a certain result."
Gorla, The Theory of Object of Contract in Civil Law: A CriticalAnalysis by Means of
the Comparative Method, 28 TUL. L. REV. 442, 456 (1954) (emphasis added).
62. "The key question is how far can the law go in protecting the reasonable expectations of franchisees without endangering the economic viability of franchising as
a dynamic and expanding system of distribution? The answer in the long run should be
shaped in accordance with the economic [and political, in the broad sense] goals and
priorities of a free society." Hewitt, supra note 9, 29 Bus. LAW. at 236.
63. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 11, 1764, 1779(4), 1895 & 1901.
64. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1756-1760.
65. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1756-1760 & 1779.
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tions of contracts include obligations implied by law;"0 one obligation
implied by law is the duty to perform contracts in good faith. Other
obligations, considered to be incidental" to any particular contract,
arise from custom or equity and supply terms of the agreement
about which the parties reasonably may be presumed to have been
silent because they contemplated that the law imposed those terms
in the absence of express contractual provisions." Equity demands
that persons treat one another as they would have themselves
treated, and that persons not enrich themselves (unjustly) at the expense of another.10 Indeed, the codal articles on the interpretation of
agreements prohibit giving literal effect to express clauses when to
do so would lead to unreasonable or absurd consequences."
66. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1903.
67. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1901. Common law commentators are beginning to appreciate fully the notion of an implied obligation of good faith performance, although
the expressions of the principle's content vary. An "internalized" view (see text
discussion at p. 231. infra) is that a party is prohibited from doing anything that will
injure the right of the other party from receiving the benefit of his bargain, see
Holmes. supra note 10, at 332-34, thus "a party lisrequired] to strike an equitable
balance when a conflict of interest appears." Id. at 377 (footnote omitted). One scholar
has stated succinctly that to "act in good faith is to exercise one's formal entitlements
in the spirit of solidarity. The good faith standard requires one to find in each case the
mean between the principle that one party may disregard the interest of the other in
the exercise of his own rights and the counterprinciple that he must treat those interests exactly as if they were his own." Unger, supra note 12, at 210 (emphasis
added). Compare the italicized portion of Unger's statement with the definition of equity given in Civil Code article 1965, and note the connexity between good faith and
equity. The abuse of rights doctrine embraces both of these notions. See the text
beginning at p. 231, infra. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 (Tent.
Draft No. 5,1970). and authorities cited in note 12, supra.
68. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 17643).
69. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1903, 1963 & 1967.
70. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1965. See generally Stone, The So-Called UnprovidedFor Case, 53 TUL. L. REV. 93, 95-97 (1978); Tate, The Louisiana Action for Unjustified
Enrichment. A Study in Judicial Process Part II), 51 TUL. L. REV. 446 (1977); Tate,
The Louisiana Action for Unjustified Enrichment. A Study inJudicial Process (Part
I, 50 TUL. L. REV. 883 (1976)h Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and
Louisiana Law (PartIDl, 37 TUL. L. REV. 49 (1962); Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in
the Civil Law and Louisiana Law (PartI, 36 TUL. L. REV. 605 (1962); Comment, Actio
De In Rem Verso in Louisiana;Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc, 43 TUL. L. REv. 263
(1969); Note, Conditions for the Application of Actio De In Rem Verso, 36 LA. L. REV.
312 (1975), (discussing Edmonston v. A-Second Mtg. Co., 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974)).
71. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1945-1962, 1963-1967; National Safe Corp. v. Benedict
& Myrick, Inc., 371 So. 2d 792, 795 (La. 1979); Martin-Parry Corp. v. New Orleans Fire
Detection Serv.. 221 La. 667, 681, 60 So. 2d 83, 84 (1952); Dixie Campers, Inc. v. Vesely
Co., 389 So. 2d 889, 891-92 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ granted, 395 So. 2d 812 (La.
1980), rev'd, 398 So. 2d 1087 (La. 1981); Lanneau v. Capital Transp. Corp., 292 So. 2d
810, 816 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Crow v. Monsell, 200 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1967).
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To understand the Code is to realize that it has adopted only in
a limited fashion the strict classical doctrine of contract, which emphasizes the principles of security of transactions, sanctity of the
will, and freedom of contract almost to the exclusion of fairness to
the individual and of a sense of social justice. The Code has wrapped
numerous protections around the individual, such as vices of consent," the failure of cause doctrine," requirements related to capacity," and lesion."
Thus, when confronted with a franchise termination clause, the
court's function is to determine not only what protection applies but
when it is to be applied." A franchisor's continuing"7 obligation
under an "at will" termination clause is dependent upon an express
resolutory" potestative7 ' condition.s Although the state jurisprudence and doctrine concerning conditional obligations have been at
times inconsistent or not articulated fully, a summary herein proves
useful."1 The early jurisprudence failed to distinguish between purely potestative conditions,"' solely dependent upon the whim, caprice,
72. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 18i9-1859, 1881 & 1882.
73. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1893-1900.
74. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1780-1796.
75. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1860-1880, 2665 & 2666.
76. The analysis begins, of course, with an examination of the Civil Code. Tate,
Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 LA. L. REV. 727 (1962); Tate,
Civilian Methodology in Louisiana,44 TUL. L. REv. 673 (1970).
77. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1899.
78. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2026 & 2045.
79. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2024, 2034 & 2036.
80. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2020-2047.
.81. See generally Brown, The Potestative Condition in Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REV.
23 (1931); Brown, Potestative Conditions and Illusory Promises, 5 TUL. L. REV. 396
(1931); Palmer & Plauch6, Jr., A Review of the Louisiana Law on Potestative Conditions, 47 TUL. L. REV. 284 (1973).
82. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2035. For example, A promises to B that A will buy
from B a thing, if A decides to buy it. A's promise is illusory. Compare this example
with that given by Brown, supra note 81, 6 TUL. L. REv. at 25: A promises to sell to B
if B wishes to buy. Note that in conditional commutative contracts, each party is both
an obligee and an obligor, and his status as either one may be conditional. In Brown's
example, B is an unconditional obligee with respect to A's promise to sell, and is an
obliger subject to a purely potestative suspensive condition with respect to B's obligation
to pay the price, which arises upon*the exercise of the option. The Louisiana courts seemingly forget the civilian doctrine of unilateral contracts, which is the result of Brown's example, since A is still bound unconditionally. Thus the courts often invalidate an entire contract. instead of the obligation therein subject to a purely potestative suspensive condition.
Sea LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2024, 2034-20386; Palmer & Plauch6, Jr., supra note 81, at 289.
See alto Martin-Parry Corp. v. New Orleans Fire Detection Sere., 221 La. 677, 682-83,
60 ", 2d 83, 85 (1952) (dictum).
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or will of the obligor, and simply potestative conditions in which the
exercise of the obligor's will is constrained by substantial adverse
consequences attached to the exercise of will." Failing to make this
distinction, courts construed seemingly potestative conditions as
mixed conditions in order to prevent what they perceived to be illusory promises from nullifying agreements. Many contracts to sell
real estate, for example, are conditioned upon one or several of the

following: (1) the buyer's obtaining suitable financing; (2) the buyer's
ability to sell his present home; and (3) the seller's ability to deliver
a title satisfactory to the buyer. In each instance, the purchaser may
prevent or delay consummation of the sale by not seeking financing,
by not placing his present home on the market, or by declaring un-

satisfactory his vendor's title. Cases dealing with these problems
generally took two approaches. First, a court might interpret the
conditions so as to reflect the "reasonable" intent of the parties, thus
imposing an objective standard of reasonable behavior under the circumstances upon the conditional obligor." Second, by misreading
83. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2035; King v. King, 185 So. 2d 893, 895 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1966).
84. Since 1931 the Louisiana courts have had continued success in deciding cases
containing allegedly purely potestative conditions by resorting to a "reasonable
man" objective test. Under this test, the courts inquire into the intention behind a
contract clause that on its face gives one party an arbitrary option to perform.
Often they are able to determine that the obligation is actually not conditioned on
the arbitrary will of one of the parties.
Palmer & PlauchK, Jr., supra note 81, at 299. See also Brown, supra note 81, 6 TUL. L.
REV. at 37 (1931). In many cases the objective standard was phrased in terms of a requirement of good faith performance.
On appeal of the trial court's sustaining an exception of no cause of action, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the plaintiff lessor had stated a cause of action for
the cancellation of and damages for the breach of an automotive dealership, garage,
and filling station lease. Huber v. Taussig. 224 La. 453, 69 So. 2d 919 (1953). discussed
in Smith, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-1954 Term- Conventional Obligations, 15 LA. L. REV. 282, 283-84 (1955). The lease, tied to an exclusivepurchase requirements contract, gave the defendant lessee the option to terminate the
requirements contract if a change of the lessor's jobber was not "satisfactory" to the
lessee. The court held that the lessee was under a duty'to determine by a bona fide
exercise of judgment whether the substituted goods were satisfactory according to an
objective standard and could not act arbitrarily and without justification. But see
Jackson v. New Orleans Bd. of Trade, Ltd., 207 La. 571, 21 So. 2d 731 (1945), discussed
in Pascal, Work of the LouisianaSupreme Court for the 1944-1945 Term- Obligations,
Contracts and Mandate, 6 LA. L. REV. 587 (1946), in which the court in dictum stated
that an attorney's fee arrangement with the defendant Board, whereby the Board was
to determine the fee, would have involved a purely potestative condition.
The second circuit in Franks v. Louisiana Health Services and Indem. Co., 382 So.
2d 1064 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980). a case involving a group health policy excluding
coverage of hospital admissions not medically necessary in the judgment of the com-
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Civil Code article 2040 to mean that the condition is fulfilled
"against" the party preventing fulfillment of the condition, regardless of whether the obstructing party was the conditional obligor, a
court might find fulfillment of the condition when the purchaser has
made insubstantial efforts to comply with the condition." Both approaches err in that if such conditions are construed to be purely
potestative, then the capricious exercise of the purchaser's will can
be nothing other than fulfillment of the condition. Similar problem
areas have involved employment contract terminations" and
brokerage contracts."
pany, held that the insurance company was obligated to make an honest, sincere effort
to determine the medical necessity of an admission. Cf. Lopez v. Blue Cross of La.,
397 So. 2d 1343 (La. 1981) (construing LA. R.S. 22:657(A) (1950) to require health and
accident insurers to pay properly presented claims within 30 days, "unless just and
reasonable grounds such as would put a reasonable and prudent businessman on his
guard that the claim is unjust, exist." 397 So. 2d at 1345). The second circuit gave a
similar interpretation to a contract between a sewerage company and a real estate
developer to furnish sewerage service to a subdivision, up to fifty connections. D'Arbonne Sewerage, Inc. v. Sanders, 259 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972). Accord, Crow
v. Monsell, 200 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967) (seller's refusal to tender title according to a contract to sell real estate); Brewater v. Yockey, 153 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1963) (a contract to sell real estate conditioned upon the purchaser's securing a
specified loan imposed on the buyer the duty to make bona fide efforts to obtain the
loan; under the facts, one attempt was insufficient). But see Motors Sec. Co., Inc. v.
Tulos, 178 So. 634 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938), discussed in Note, Chattel MortgageSecurity Clause as a Potestative Condition, 2 LA. L. REV. 548 (1940).
85. See, e.g., Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 305
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1979) (an oil and gas lessee's failure to use the fire flooding oil
recovery technique, the only one available for the disputed field, was a failure to
develop diligently the premises); Lopez v. Broussard, 308 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975) (involving a contract of sale conditioned on the purchaser's ability to sell her
mobile home (itself a condition to her ability to obtain suitable financing for the purchase sued upon]; under the facts her single attempt to sell the mobile home was a good
faith effort to fulfill the condition). Accord, Freedman v. Faid, 176 So. 2d 213 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1965); Slack v. Munson, 61 So. 2d 618 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952). See also Morrison v. Mioton, 163 La. 1065, 113 So. 456 (1927); Boudreaux v. Elite Homes, Inc., 259
So. 2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
86. See Long v. Foster & Assocs., Inc., 242 La. 295, 136 So. 2d 48 (1961); MartinParry Corp. v. New Orleans Fire Detection Serv., 221 La. 677, 60 So. 2d 83 (1952). The
court in each case upheld the validity of at will termination clauses in employment contracts on the basis that either party, as opposed to only one, could terminate the
employment relationship. For a criticism of the court's approach see Palmer &
Plauch6, Jr., supra note 81, at 293.
87. In a recent case a plaintiff broker stated a cause of action where the defendant seller allegedly attempted to circumvent his obligation to pay broker's fees by requiring the buyer-procured through the broker's efforts and ready, willing, and able
to complete the transaction-to represent contrary to the facts that the broker had
not procured his participation in the transaction. Associated Executive Control v.
Bankers Union Life Ins. Co., 367 So. 2d 811 (La. 1979). Cf Stephen L. Guice & Co., Inc.
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After some time of confusion and scholarly criticism," the Louisiana bench recognized not only the differences between the
various types of conditions, but also the different consequences arising from their nature as resolutory or suspensive." That a series of
successive or continuing obligations may be made subject to a
resolutory purely potestative condition is apparent from a reading
of Civil Code articles 2036 and 1899; article 2040 is not applicable.
Despite the courts' confusion about the codal scheme governing conditional obligations, a unifying rationale linking the cases emerges.
The courts are extremely reluctant to sanction behavior substantially
deviating from the parties' probable intention at the time of contract formation. By a circuitous route, the courts have rendered
results consistent with the principle succinctly summarized by article
2037, that "[e]very condition must be performed in the manner that
it is probable that the parties wished and intended that it should be."
The doctrine of abuse of rights is an appropriate constraint upon
the exercise of the right of an "at will" franchise termination clause.
The doctrine, used in conjunction with a preliminary analysis of the
exercise of the right as a function of the parties' expectations at the
time of the formation of the contract, is an appropriate legal model
for the judicial control of franchise relationships. The doctrine is applied within the framework of the principles of basic contract law,
the codal provisions governing conditional obligations, and the implied obligation to perform agreements in good faith."
v. Perkowaski, 12 So. 2d 692 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1943), discussed in Note, Contracts-Simple Potestative Conditions-Duty of Obligor, 18 TUL. L. REv. 160 (1943) (a
broker was allowed to recover fees from a purchaser who breached a contract to sell

real estate, conditioned upon his ability to secure a loan from any New Orleans homestead association on their regular terms and conditions, by refusing to accept a loan arranged for him by the plaintiff broker as per the contract to sell). The court called the
contingency a mixed condition, since it was contingent upon homestead actions as well
as those of the purchaser. See generally Comment, Real Estate Brokerage in Loui-

siana, 17 LA. L. REV. 820 (1957), in which the good faith standard is discussed at
828. See also Comment, The Law of Real Estate Brokerage Contracts: The Broker's
Commission, 41 LA. L. REV. 857 (1981).
88. See authorities cited in note 81, supra.
89. See Professional Billing Agency. Inc. v. Tarantino, 350 So. 2d 258, 261 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1977); King v. King, 185 So. 2d 893. 895 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
90. The courts increasingly are relying upon the Code's central theme of good
faith and fair dealing. Although Louisiana has not adopted the theory of tortious
breach of contract, it provides near-equivalent sanctions for subjectively "bad"
behavior by application of contractual remedies. For instance, in Roussel Pump &
Elea Co. v. Sanderson, 216 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968). a franchisor and
employees of a franchisee allegedly conspired to end the franchise contract (which was
subject to cancellation without cause on the anniversary date) and to establish the
employees as replacement franchisees after they left their employment at the current
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An important threshold question must be answered in the
negative before the abuse of rights doctrine should be involved: Was
the condition performed in the manner probably intended by the
franchisee's business. The franchisee sued on both tortious breach of contract and
breach of contract grounds. The appellate court held that the appropriate remedy lay
ex contractu, and not ex delicto under Civil Code article 2324.
The supreme court advanced this theme in National Safe Corp. v. Benedict &
Myrick, Inc., 371 So. 2d 792 (La. 1979). The franchisor, National, sued the exfranchisee. B&M, to collect an allegedly past due account. B&M resisted the claim and
reconvened for damages on the basis that National had breached the franchise contract
by soliciting an employee of B&M, one Sibley, and by seeking to establish Sibley as
the exclusive Louisiana dealer for National safe security systems. B&M had built up
steadily the Louisiana market for National products when National altered the termination clause of the franchise contract (which was otherwise identical to the original
agreement) to allow termination "at any time by either party." The new agreement
(executed by B&M, which was unaware of the change) was made because National was
contemplating giving the dealership to a partnership formed by a former National vicepresident and Sibley. Id. at 793. The court declined the opportunity to allow tort
damages for tortious inducement of the breach of the employment relationship. It did,
however, allow an action in contract respecting the franchise agreement, despite the
contention of National that the franchise contained no clause prohibiting this action by
it. Citing Civil Code articles 1901, 1903, 1964, and 1965, the court concluded that "good
faith performance of the contract would reprobate National's actions." Id at 795. Applying the test of equity, it noted: "We are certain that if the roles of the contracting
parties were reversed National would not expect to be treated as it treated Benedict
& Myrick." Id. at 795.
A case involving the interpretation of an exclusive dealership for the sale of certain
camping supplies arose soon after in Dixie Campers, Inc. v. Vesely Co., 389 So. 2d 889
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ granted, 395 So. 2d 812 (La. 1980). Dixie was
defendant's authorized "'Apache dealer for the sale and distribution of Apache camping trailers and parts and accessories marketed by Vesely ....

"'

Id at 890 (emphasis

by the court in quoting a portion of the dealership agreement). The controversy surrounded the word "and" in the clause quoted above. Vesely agreed not to sell "any
Apache products" to other dealers in a specified five-parish area. Vesely claimed that
its contract with Dixie covered only camping trailers and their parts and accessories,
and not other types of Apache products, such as travel trailers, motor homes, and mini
homes, and that its establishment of dealerships pertaining to those products within
the five-parish area was neither a breach of the express contract, nor of its implied
good faith obligations. The court agreed with this construction of the contract, and distinguished National Safe on the basis that this was a proper, reasonable and equitable
understanding of the parties' intentions. Id. at 893. As to the interpretation of the ambiguous clause, see Allen, Some Uses of Symbolic Logic in Law Practice, ABA
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ELECTRONIC DATA RETRIEVAL, MODERN USES OF LOGIC IN LAW

119 (June 1962). Shortly before publication of this article the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed the fourth circuit and denied of the defendant's motion for a summary judgment.
Dixie Campers, Inc. v. Vesely Co., 398 So. 2d 1087 (La. 1981). The court held that,
"taken as a whole, the ... (franchise contract was) ambiguous as to whether it relates
to a class of trailers including travel and mini-home trailers or refers to one type of
trailer within a group." Id. at 1088. See also Wilson v. Cost Plus of Vivian, Inc. 375
So. 2d 683 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
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parties? If so, the non-terminating party has no grounds for complaint, because he has obtained the very thing for which he bargained.
One scholar, in an attempt to resolve the problem of uncertain performance within an economic expectations and cost theory under
traditional contract law, has proposed an objective test for answering this question." Burton theorizes that the parties discount the
future value of uncertain future performance, and that their
bargaining behavior reflects this cost element. Under Burton's
analysis, bad faith performance is more than merely a case of
diminishing the expected benefits of the promisee; it is also a case in
which the "discretion-exercising party refuses to pay the expected
cost of performance."" Good faith performance occurs "when a party's
discretion is exercised for any purpose within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of formation-to capture opportunities that were preserved upon entering into the contract, interpreted objectively."' 8 Thus, two questions must be asked to aid in answering the initial question: What was the purpose of the terminating
party? Was that purpose within the reasonable contemplation of the
parties?" If the discretion-exercising party has attempted to capture
opportunities not bargained and paid for, then the abuse of rights doctrine is unnecessary to protect the non-breaching party. Parties to
franchise agreements seldom calculate the costs of uncertainty arising from "bad faith" terminations based upon non-market factors
such as personal animosities existing between high-level personnel.
Even if the terminating party has acted within his contractual
rights under this time of formation analysis, he still may be constrained by the rules prohibiting the abuse of rights.
The doctrine of abuse of rights, like its cousin doctrine of unjust
enrichment, has received little doctrinal or jurisprudential scrutiny
in Louisiana until recent years." Although Planiol criticized the
91. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Lawv Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369 (1980).
92. Id at 373 (footnote omitted).
93. Id (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at 386.
95. See generally Bolgar, Abuse of Rights in France, Germany, and Switzerland
A Survey of a Recent Chapter in Legal Doctrine, 35 LA. L. REv. 1017 (1975); CuetoRua, Abuse of Rights, 35 LA. L. REv. 965 (1975): Sono & Fijoka, The Role of the Abuse
of Right Doctrine in Japan, 35 LA. L. REv. 1037 (1975). See also Housing Authority of
7 -ke Charles v. Minor, 355 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) ("[The Louisiana] courts,
the basis of equity, are vested with the discretion under some circumstances to
decline to grant a lessor cancellation of a lease although such right appears to be
otherwise available to him." Id at 273.).
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abuse of rights theory on semantic grounds," it remains nevertheless a viable and extremely useful civilian tool. Ih an analysis
adopted in large part by the courts," Professor Cueto-Rua states
that rights may be abused when certain "acts ...are performed by
persons whom the legal order entitles ... to request performance of
duties and obligations which other parties owe them."" Although
persons normally have broad discretion in exercising their rights, a
civilian court should not aid the exercise thereof when to do so
would violate a principle of fundamental fairness or would not contribute to or would harm public order. Judicial experience has
resulted in the articulation of the following criteria for ascertaining
the abusive exercise of a right. Was the right sought to be exercised:
(1) for the sole purpose of harming another; or
(2) for the predominant purpose of harming another; or
(3) with no substantial and legitimate benefit to the holder of
the right and a substantial detriment to the person against
whom the right is sought to be enforced; or
(4) against good faith, good customs, or positive morality; or
(5) in pursuit of an end contrary to the end on account of which
the right was conferred?"
Except in the third criterion, the tests formulated above are in
large part the questions asked in the threshold question. The difference is that the abuse of rights doctrine seeks the answers from
a viewpoint external to the contract on the basis of a scheme of
order independent from that created by the contract; the threshold
question analyzes the attempted behavior from an economically internalized intra-contract perspective. Because the doctrine has been
so seldom used in Louisiana, a thorough understanding of the principal cases relying upon it is necessary to judge its suitability for an
increasingly prominent role in a complex and litigious society.
The genesis of Louisiana's abuse of rights doctrine occurs in the
famous Higgins Oil'" case. Higgins Oil had drilled a producing oil
96. Planiol did so on the basis that a right is inherently limited to proper use, and
the wrongful act is not, therefore, abuse of a right but is an act not based upon any
right. Indeed, one is led to the conclusion that the abuse of rights doctrine is the
segregation from delictual fault that fault denominated "abuse of right," which
causes damage to another who is entitled to redress. See Bolgar. supra note 95, at
1023.

97. Cueto-Rua, supra note 95 passim.
98. Id at 983.

99. Id
100. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919).
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well on its property. Guaranty Oil drilled a nearby oil weil on adjacent property, which failed to produce oil. On abandoning the dry
hole Guaranty Oil failed to plug the well. By means of an
underground communication between the well shafts, air entered
the Higgins Oil well from the unplugged Guaranty Oil well, thus
reducing significantly the former well's production. Higgins Oil sued
when Guaranty Oil failed to comply with an amicable demand to
replace the plug. Justice Provosty resorted to an analysis of the
codal provisions governing neighborhood, ownership, and delictual
fault. Still unable 'to draw a clear conclusion, he consulted civilian
doctrine. After holding that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action
for damages, Provosty explained the primary factors influencing the
court's decision to grant the plaintiff recovery: Replacing the plug
was of small expense and little inconvenience to the defendant; no
serious and legitimate interest was being served by Guaranty Oil's
refusal to act; no showing was made that leaving the well uncapped
was necessary or sufficient to prevent oil from being drawn from
under the defendant's property. On the contrary, substantial
evidence established that the reduced output of the Higgins Ol well
resulted in the impoverishment of the tract by other wells piercing
the underlying common reservoir. The court expressly applied the
third criterion for discovering an abuse of right situation.
The supreme court implicity used the fourth criterion of good
faith in allowing a broker to recover fees for services rendered in
0' Plaintiff Onorato, a real estate broker, was
Onorato v. Maestri.1
hired by the defendant Maestri to procure a suitable lessee for certian property owned by Maestri. The broker performed as anticipated; by agreement with his principal, the broker's fees were
deferred six months after the execution of the lease so that the
defendant lessor might use the lessee's pre-payment of six months'
rent to prepare the premises for occupancy. Thereafter, the rent
was to be applied directly to the broker's fees until paid. Shortly
after the execution of the lease, the lessee was placed into receivership. A clause in the lease gave the lessor the option to call the entire rental due immediately or to terminate the lease upon the insolvency of the lessee. The lessor opted for the latter course and
obtained a judicial dissolution of the lease. Securing this judgment,
he entered into a new lease with the receiver with the same rental
as in the original lease. Because the rents were attributable to this
new lease, claimed the lessor, his obligation to pay the deferred
101.

173 La. 375, 137 So. 67 (1931).
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broker fees was extinguished, since no rents were payable from the
first lease from which the parties agreed to satisfy the broker's
claim. The supreme court agreed with the plaintiff broker that the
lessor had acted in a manner not consistent with the good faith performance of his obligation arising from the brokerage contract."'
Although the court applied the Civil Code articles on vices of consent concerning the use of the forms of law as a type of violence, z8
clearly the court was applying principles of good faith.
No further development of the abuse of rights doctrine occurred
for forty-nine years until Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc.'"
The plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant, was fired through
no fault of his own during an economic downturn. Morse had participated in certain deferred compensation plans-namely a Supplemental Compensation Plan, which was a bonus-incentive plan, and
a Retirement Plan. Clauses in the plans purportedly caused the
"forfeiture" or "non-vesting" of the portions of the plaintiffs interest, if any, in the plans upon the termination of his employment.
When Morse sued to recover the allegedly lost benefits, the trial
court upheld the validity of the clauses and the appellate court affirmed.' 8
On original hearing the supreme court reversed in favor of the
plaintiff Morse. The court characterized the issue as follows:
Even if under the terms of a plan no interest of the employee
has "vested" so as to become payable, are there ever circumstances where nevertheless the employee may recover such
deferred compensation (or its value of benefits based thereupon)
despite contractual clauses which require forfeiture or prevent
vesting should the employment terminate prior to a vesting
date?'"
Citing numerous Code articles,"' the court concluded that the
clauses at issue were "manifestly unjust, contrary to public order
and public policy....
On rehearing the defendant argued that Civil Code article 2040
does not contemplate the situation in which the "debtor" prevents
102.
103.
104.
105.

173 La. at 881, 187 So. at 69.
LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1856 & 1857.
844 So. 2d 1853 (La. 1977).
Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., 330 So. 2d 411 (La. App. 4th Cir.

1976).
106. 844 So. 2d at 1857.
107. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 11, 12, 19, 1764, 1892, 1895, 1901, 1986, 2031 & 2040.
106. 844 So. 2d at 188 (footnote omitted).
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the fulfillment of the condition merely by exercising a legal right,
namely, laying off an employee due to an economic decline in the.industry. Assuming arguendo the correctness of the argument, the
court countered it by invoking the abuse of rights doctrine. The
court applied the third citerion enumerated by Professor Cueto-Rua,
because
[the] company's interest in not waiving the requirements . . . is
so insignificant in comparison with our strong public policy
against wage forfeiture as to constitute neither a legitimate nor
serious interest. The exercise of a right (here, to discharge an
employee while opting not to waive the nontermination requirement) without legitimate and serious interest, even where there
is neither alleged nor proved an intent to harm, constitutes an
abuse of right which courts should not countenance.'"
For reasons not entirely clear, the court reversed itself as to the
Retirement Plan. Finding the "exercise of a legal right" exception to
article 2040 applicable, as well as an absence of an abuse of that
right, Morse was said to have had his expectations under the Retirement Plan subject to the clear and unequivocal terms and conditions
of the plan.110 Although the distinctions between the two plans were
probably differences without meaning in the context of the case,
McDermott is nonetheless instructive, if not entirely persuasive, in
its abuse of rights analysis.
The McDermott court gave several reasons for concluding that
the company was not exercising its right in furtherance of any
serious and legitimate interest. Two classes benefitted from the
company's decision not to waive the Plan requirements. Although
the company alone contributed to the Supplemental Compensation
Plan fund, money which remained in the fund was not returned to
the company nor included in its current income. Co-employees
benefitted from the increased amount of funds, and the company had
at its disposal, without an increased cost to itself, more funds with
which to increase the incentive for managerial employees to improve
their performance. 1 ' Although the court correctly stated the effects
of the company's decision, it improperly characterized those effects
109. Id. at 1369.
110. Id. The court left open the question of whether the same result as to the SCP
would obtain in the absence of a waiver clause; if the company could avoid the
"strong" public interest asserted by the court merely by deleting the clause, the
strength of that public interest must be questioned.
111. Id.
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as insubstantial. In an economic decline in an industry, the economy
is signalling that too many resources are being put into the industry
in proportion to the demand for its products. As market forces seek
to restore equilibrium, a company will reduce its costs in an attempt
to restore prior profit levels. Labor, a variable cost of usually low
productivity compared to capital, is often the first area of costcutting. That lay-offs may result in increased opportunities for the
firm and its employees to become more efficient is a serious and
legitimate interest to the firm and to society. The court's decision
unduly and unnecessarily restricted a firm's flexibility in adjusting
to changing market conditions. Thus an incorrect result was reached
after a potentially fruitful inquiry. Indeed, the court must have
perceived the adverse impact of its original decision since it
recharacterized the Retirement Plan on rehearing.
Another opportunity to delinate the doctrine arose shortly after
McDermott in the InternationalHarvester case."" Defendant lessee,
International Harvester (Harvester), had occupied the leased
premises since 1936 under a twenty-five year lease, which was
renewed. in 1960 and was to expire in 1986. In 1971 the Louisiana
Superdome was built across the street from the leased premises,
precipitating rapid acceleration of property values in the vicinity of
the arena. Having moved off the premises to a new location in 1974,
the defendant contemplated subleasing the vacated building to a
parking garage concern. A lease provision prohibited the subletting
of the property by the lessee without the prior written consent of
the plaintiff lessor, Illinois Central Gulf Railroad (Gulf), which Gulf
withheld. After disposing of Harvester's contention that Gulf had
impliedly consented to a modification of the lease terms to allow the
subletting of the premises for parking garage purposes, the court
faced the argument that Gulf was abusing its right to withhold permission under the sublease clause."'
Noting that the lease called for exclusive use of the property as
a truck sales and service facility, Justice Dennis characterized the
lessee's demand as a request to sublet and as an attempt to change
the nature of the use of the property. The court's analysis of the
abuse of rights doctrine relied almost entirely upon Professor CuetoRua's article."' The opinion-concluded that "judicial enforcement of ...
[the lessor's] right to withhold permission for the sublease and
112. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 1009
(La. 1979).
113. d. at 1010.
114. See Cueto-Rua, supra note 95.
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change of use by Harvester would not sanction an abuse of right,"
under any of the five criteria for ascertaining abusive acts. 1'
Several factors influenced the decision. Gulf refused to sublet as a
part of its effort to terminate the lease or to renegotiate it in order
to capture the greatly enhanced real estate value. Endeavoring to
end its "inequitable" rental receipts was said to be an action taken
with a serious and legitimate motive. Furheimore, the refusal was
not adamant or irrevocable,,(although the *relevance of this factor is
questionablei. Behavior by the lessee also*prejudiced its case, for the
lessee did not press vigorously its demand for consent, either
amicably or by seeking judicial intervention. As negotiations for the
lease cancellation began, Harvester sublet the premises despite
Guirs prior lack of consent and without its knowledge. Without
discussion, the court held that Gulf's actions plainly were not in
violation of good faith, moral rules, or elementary fairness, for Gulf
candidly had disclosed to the lessee its motives, and had made
significant concessions during the course of the lease cancellation
negotiations."' The case is important in two principal respects:
First, it indicates a judicial willingness to embrace the civilian doctrine in its fullest form; second, the decision further refines the doctrine to require that the party invoking it have "clean hands." This
second aspect is an appropriate addition to the five criteria for the
doctrine is invocable as a special remedy only, and should not be
available to a plaintiff who has violated its precepts.
Although the McDermott and InternationalHarvester cases are
too recent for the appellate courts to have put a significant gloss on
the doctrine in practice, one recent decision merits attention. In
Housing Authority of Abbeville v. Herbert,.1 the defendant tenant
of a public housing project appealed an adverse city court judgment
favoring the Authority's demand for eviction. Although a lease provision prohibited tenants from keeping pets in the apartments, the
Authority had not enforced the clause for over twenty years. In an
apparent "crackdown" on pets in the apartments, the project
tenants were given thirty days' prior written notice of the Authority's
intent to enforce the letter of the contract. The eviction suit was filed
when the tenant failed to remove his pets from the premises. The
third circuit affirmed, holding that the Authority could enforce the
lease provision. Merely listing the criteria for discovering an abuse
of rights, as proposed by Professor Cueto-Rua and adopted by the
115. 388 So. 2d at 1014 (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. 387 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
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supreme court in International Harvester,the court stated without
explanation that it found no occasion to invoke the doctrine. 1 8'
Perhaps a methodology for analyzing franchise terminations
under the abuse of rights doctrine may best be illustrated by
returning to the Corenswet "hypothetical.""11 The first step would
require that the termination have been exercised in a manner probably intended by the parties. Of course, one indicator of this intention is the wording of the contractual termination clause; another is
the trade custom in the industry at the time of the contract. In any
event, the words should not be interpreted so as to lead to absurd
consequences. By contractually circumscribing the parties' opportunities, a standard exists by which to judge their subsequent actions. If a party acts without the contractually defined boundary, he
is breaching the contract. If his actions fall within the boundary, the
abuse of rights doctrine becomes relevant. Hence an answer to the
threshold question requires a thorough understanding of the contract and its commerical setting.
Given the assumption that the franchisee and franchisor did not
intend to be bound permanently, the determinants of that finite
time period must be ascertained. Although a listing of all factors is
neither possible nor necessary, a few important factors might include the efforts and success of the franchisee in promoting the franchised products, confidence in the other party's solvency, skills and
adaptability to the market, and the presence of alternative uses of
firm resources yielding higher economic profits. The termination
date probably was not intended to be solely a function of character
clashes between high level personnel.
Interfirm compatibility is an important factor in a continuing
commercial relationship; however, if the rivalry between the
presidents reached a level which marginally affected everyday
operations, the five criteria for analyzing an abuse of rights situation would be used in light of the facts. Due consideration of the
civilian principles of contract law, and of the competing forces shaping its solutions, will result in a proper solution to the case, for the
analysis focuses upon the private and societal interests involved,
rather than blindly adhering to traditional, and sometimes inappropriate, contract law.
Pannal Alan Sanders
118. Id at 697.
119. See text at 210, supra.

